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AGOSTINI v. FELTON: SHIFTING THE EVIDENTIARY BURDEN
IN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CHALLENGES BACK
TO THE PLAINTIFF
In Agostini v. Felton,' the United States Supreme Court considered
whether recent changes in the Court's Establishment Clause2 jurispru-
dence justified relief under Federal Rule 60(b) (5)3 from a permanent
injunction entered twelve years earlier after the Court held in Aguilar
v. Felton4 that a program that placed public school employees in reli-
gious schools to teach remedial classes was unconstitutional.5 The
Court, overruling its decision in Aguilar, answered affirmatively and
held that a government-funded program that places supervised public
employees in religious schools to provide supplemental remedial in-
struction to disadvantaged children on a neutral basis does not violate
the Establishment Clause.6 The Court reasoned that its recent Estab-
lishment Clause decisions had so undermined the basic assumptions
upon which Aguilar rested that it was no longer good law.' The
Court's abandonment of these assumptions and its reliance on the
factual findings of the district court effectively shift the evidentiary
burden in Establishment Clause cases from the government back to
the plaintiff.
1. 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." Id.
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). Rule 60(b)(5) provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a
party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: . . . (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or dis-
charged, or a priorjudgment upon which it is based has been reversed or other-
wise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application.
Id.
4. 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled ly Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2017.
5. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2003, 2006.
6. Id. at 2016.
7. See id. at 2010, 2016; see also infra Part III.
AGOSTINI V. FEL TON
I. THE CASE
Congress enacted Tide I of the Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion Act of 1965 (Tide 1)' to "provid[e] full educational opportunity
to every child regardless of economic background."9 The program
channels federal funds, through the States, to "local education agen-
cies" (LEAs), which use these funds to provide remedial education,
guidance counseling, and job training to all eligible students, whether
they attend public or nonpublic schools. 10 Tide I services must be
"secular, neutral, and nonideological";" must "supplement, and in no
case supplant, the level of services" already provided by the nonpublic
school;12 and may be provided only to those private school students
who meet the eligibility requirements.13 To be eligible, a student
must live within the attendance boundaries of a public school located
in a low-income area, and be failing, or in danger of failing, the State's
student performance standards.
14
Tide I services are subject to additional constraints when they are
provided to children enrolled in private schools. 5 LEAs can provide
these services only to private school students eligible for aid, must re-
tain title to all materials used, and must provide the services "through
public employees or other persons independent of the private school
and any religious institution. '"16
In 1966, the New York City Board of Education (Board) began
using public school employees to provide Tide I services to private
school students.' 7 Because more than ninety percent of New York's
8. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6514 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996)). Tide I has been
reenacted several times since 1965. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2003 n.*. The Agostini Court
referred to the current Tide I provisions, which are found in the Improving America's
Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 6301-6514 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996)), but noted that they "do not differ meaningfully"
from the Title I program referred to in Aguilar. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2003 n.*.
9. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2003 (alteration in original) (quoting S. RP. No. 89-146, at 5
(1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1446, 1450).
10. Id. at 2003-04 (citing 20 U.S.C. §§6311; 6312; 6314(b)(1)(B)(i),(iv);
6315(c)(1) (A), (E)).
11. Id. at 2004 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 6321(a) (2)).
12. Id. (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 200.12(a) (1996)).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2003-04 (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 6313(a) (2) (B), 6315(b)(1)(B)).
15. Id at 2004.
16. Id (citing 20 U.S.C. § 6321 (c)(1), (2)).
17. Id; Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 406 (1985), overruled by Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at
2017. Private school students comprise approximately 10% of students eligible to receive
Tide I services. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2004.
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private schools were religious,"8 "the Board initially arranged to trans-
port [eligible private school students] to public schools for after-
school Title I instruction." "9 However, the plan ultimately failed be-
cause "[a] ttendance was poor, teachers and children were tired, and
parents were concerned for the safety of their children."2 The Board
then chose to provide after-school instruction on private school cam-
puses." When this also yielded mixed results, the Board imple-
mented a plan calling for the provision of Title I services on private
school campuses during school hours.22
Public employees who provided Title I services in private schools
were given a detailed set of instructions on the rules to be followed to
effectuate the secular purpose of Title I and "to ensure that this pur-
pose was not compromised."2 They were directed to avoid involve-
ment with religious activities at the school, to bar religious materials
from their classrooms, and to minimize contact with private school
personnel.24 The employees were supervised by public officials "who
attempt[ed] to pay at least one unannounced visit per month."25 Pub-
lic employees were assigned to private schools "on a voluntary basis
and without regard to the religious affiliation of the employee or the
wishes of the private school."2 6 In fact, most of the "Title I teachers
worked in nonpublic schools with religious affiliations different from
their own."2 7
18. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2004 (citing Felton v. Secretary, United States Dep't of Educ.,
739 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1984), afj'd sub nom. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 414).
19. Id.
20. Id. (citing Felton, 739 F.2d at 51).
21. Id,
22. Id.
23. Id, The Court set forth the instructions that the public employees were given:
Specifically, employees would be told that (i) they were employees of the Board
and accountable only to their public school supervisors; (ii) they had exclusive
responsibility for selecting students for the Title I program and could teach only
those children who met the eligibility criteria for Title I; (iii) their materials and
equipment would be used only in the Title I program; (iv) they could not engage
in team-teaching or other cooperative instructional activities with private school
teachers; and (v) they could not introduce any religious matter into their teach-
ing or become involved in any way with the religious activities of the private
schools.
Id. (citing Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 406).
24. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 407.
25. Id.
26. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2004 (citing Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 406; Felton v. Secretary,
United States Dep't of Educ., 739 F.2d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 1984), affid sub nom. Aguilar, 473 U.S.
at 414).
27. Id (citing Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 406).
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In 1978, six taxpayers brought a lawsuit to enjoin the Board from
using Title I funds for instruction by public employees on the prem-
ises of sectarian schools, alleging that the Title I program, as adminis-
tered by the Board, violated the Establishment Clause.2" The district
court granted the Board's motion for summary judgment based on
the record in a case involving an identical challenge to the Title I
program" in which the court found no factual support for the allega-
tion that the Title I program impermissibly advanced religion."0
While noting that the Board's Title I program had "done so much
good and little, if any, detectable harm,""1 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit nevertheless reversed, holding that New York
City's Title I program violated the Establishment Clause.32
Before the Supreme Court, the Board argued that its system for
monitoring the content of Title I classes distinguished this case from
School District v. Ball,33 in which the Court held a similar program un-
constitutional,34 because the monitoring system eliminated the risk
that public school employees would "inculcate the religious beliefs of
the surrounding parochial school." 5 The Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that the two cases differed, but nonetheless affirmed the judg-
28. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 407.
29. Id. (citing National Coalition for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Harris, 489 F.
Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
30. Harris, 489 F. Supp. at 1265. The record in Harris included:
[E]xtensive background information on Title I; an in-depth description of New
York City's program; a detailed review of Title I rules and regulations and the
ways in which they are enforced; and the testimony and affidavits of federal offi-
cials, state officers, school administrators, Title I teachers and supervisors, and
parents of children receiving Title I services.
Id. The court found that the facts of the case did not support the assumption that provid-
ing educational services on parochial school premises advances the school's religious mis-
sion, and refused to "conjure up hypothetical situations in the face of a fourteen year
record." Id. (citing Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402, 426-27 (1974)).
31. Felton, 739 F.2d at 72.
32. Id.
33. 473 U.S. 373 (1985), overruled by Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2017.
34. In Bal4 which was decided the same day as Aguilar, the Court held that the program
at issue had the impermissible effect of promoting religion in three ways:
The state-paid instructors, influenced by the pervasively sectarian nature of the
religious schools in which they work, may subtly or overtly indoctrinate the stu-
dents in particular religious tenets at public expense. The symbolic union of
church and state inherent in the provision of secular, state-provided instruction
in the religious school buildings threatens to convey a message of state support
for religion to students and to the general public. Finally, the programs in effect
subsidize the religious functions of the parochial schools by taking over a substan-
tial portion of their responsibility for teaching secular subjects.
Id. at 397.
35. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409 (1985), overruled by Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2017.
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ment of the Second Circuit, holding that New York's Title I program
violated the Establishment Clause because its monitoring system gave
rise to excessive entanglement of religion and government. 36 In sepa-
rate dissenting opinions, Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist observed
that the records developed in Aguilar and Ball contained no evidence
of even a single incident of religious indoctrination. 7 On remand,
the district court permanently enjoined the use of publicly employed
teachers on the premises of sectarian schools.3 8
In response to Aguilar, the Board, like LEAs across the nation,
modified its program so that it could continue to provide Title I serv-
ices to eligible religious school students.3 9 Under the modified pro-
gram, Title I services were provided at public schools, at leased sites,
and in mobile classrooms parked near the sectarian schools.4"
Between 1986 and 1997, the Board spent more than $100 million
to provide these services in a manner that complied with Aguilar."H
These "Aguilar costs" meant that the LEAs had less money to spend on
remedial education.4 2 When Aguilar was decided, experts estimated
that the decision would result in a decline in the availability of Title I
services for approximately 20,000 low-income children in New York
City and 183,000 nationwide.43 In 1987, the Senate Committee on
Labor and Human Resources found that Aguilar costs had caused a
thirty-five percent reduction in the number of eligible private school
students served.'
In 1995, the Board and several parents of parochial school stu-
dents eligible for Title I services (Petitioners), under Federal Rule
60(b)," moved for relief from the injunction issued after the Court's
decision in Aguilar on the theory that the "decisional law [had]
changed to make legal what the [injunction] was designed to pre-
36. Id. at 413-14.
37. Id. at 428 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Bal4 473 U.S. at 399 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 401 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
38. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2005.
39. Id.
40. Id. The Board also furnished computer-aided instruction, which could be provided
on parochial school premises because it did not require that public employees be physi-
cally present in the schools. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 431 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 176 (1986)).
44. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2005-06 (citing S. REP. No. 100-222, at 14 (1987), reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 101, 114).
45. Id. at 2006; see supra note 3 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5)).
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vent."4 6 The district court denied the motion on the ground that the
Supreme Court had not overruled Aguilar.17 After the Court of Ap-
peals affirmed,48 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
whether changes in Establishment Clause law since Aguilar entitled
the Petitioners to relief from the permanent injunction under Rule
60(b).49
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Court's Early Approach to Establishment Clause Challenges
The Court has struggled for more than fifty years to delineate
what forms of government aid to religious schools or their students
are consistent with the Establishment Clause.50 The Court upheld
state aid to religious school students and their parents in two of the
earliest cases to consider the issue. In Everson v. Board of Education,5
the Court considered whether a New Jersey statute authorizing a local
school district to reimburse parents for the cost of bus transportation
of their children to public or Catholic schools violated the Establish-
ment Clause.52 A 5-4 majority upheld the statute, reasoning that the
"legislation, as applied, does no more than provide a general program
to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely
and expeditiously to and from accredited schools."5" Justice Black,
writing for the Court, explained that although the Establishment
Clause must be applied broadly to prevent governmental promotion
of religion, the Free Exercise Clause54 prohibits a state from exclud-
46. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2006 (alteration in original) (quoting Rufo v. Inmates of
Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 388 (1992)).
47. Id,
48. Felton v. Secretary, United States Dep't of Educ., 101 F.3d 1394 (2d Cir. 1996)
(unpublished table decision), rev'd sub nom. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2019.
49. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 759 (1997).
50. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Court referred to its struggle when
it stated: "Candor compels acknowledgment, moreover, that we can only dimly perceive
the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law." Id. at
612.
51. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
52. Id. at 5.
53. Id. at 18 (emphasis added). The Court's opinion ends with the admonishment that
the First Amendment "has erected a wall between church and state... [that] must be kept
high and impregnable," and that the Court "could not approve the slightest breach." Id.
Over the vigorous dissent of four Justices, the Court decided that the New Jersey transpor-
tation reimbursement did not breach this wall of separation. Id
54. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment immedi-
ately follows the Establishment Clause, and provides that "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." Id. (emphasis
added).
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ing people from the benefits of public welfare legislation because of
their religious faith. 5
In Board of Education v. Allen,56 the Court considered whether a
state law that required local school districts to lend textbooks free of
charge to all students in grades seven through twelve, including those
attending religious schools, violated the Establishment Clause. 7
Upon the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial
court found the law unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. 8 Consequently, there was only a "meager record" for
the Supreme Court to consider.59 The Court held that the law did not
violate the Establishment Clause, reasoning that it could not hold the
law unconstitutional based solely on judicial notice when the record
contained no evidence about particular schools, teachers, courses, or
books, or that the sectarian schools were using the books to teach reli-
gion.6 ° The majority refused to assume, absent any evidence, that
public school authorities charged with approving books for the loan
program would be unable to distinguish between secular and religious
books or that they would not honestly perform their duties under the
law.61 The Court specifically rejected the argument "that all teaching
in a sectarian school is religious or that the processes of secular and
religious training are so intertwined that secular textbooks furnished
to students by the public are in fact instrumental in the teaching of
religion."62
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Black, distinguishing his opin-
ion in Everson, argued that, unlike transportation, "[b]ooks are the
most essential tool of education" and "although 'secular,' realistically
will in some way inevitably tend to propagate the religious views of the
favored sect."6" He also warned that state aid to religious schools
would generate the kind of "discord, disharmony, hatred, and strife
among our people" that the Establishment Clause was intended to
55. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
56. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
57. Id. at 238. The Allen Court abandoned the "high and impregnable" wall rhetoric
used in Everson, see supra note 53, and recognized that "the line between state neutrality to
religion and state support of religion is not easy to locate.. . . 'The problem, like many
problems in constitutional law, is one of degree.'" Allen, 392 U.S. at 242 (quoting Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)).
58. Allen, 392 U.S. at 240-41.
59. Id. at 248.
60. Id.
61. 1& at 245.
62. Id. at 248.
63. Id. at 252 (Black, J., dissenting).
[VOL. 58:300
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prevent.64 Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion, argued that
books, unlike buses, are inherently ideological and that competing
sects would put "[p]owerful religious-political pressures .. . on the
state agencies to provide the books ... which the dominant religious
group concludes best reflect the theocentric or other philosophy of
the particular church."65
B. The Court Imposes a Burden that the Government Can Not Meet
After Everson and Allen, the Court began to assume that certain
forms of state aid advanced religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause, despite the absence of any supporting evidence in the record.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,66 the Court articulated and applied a three-part
test (the Lemon test) to determine whether statutes authorizing salary
subsidies for teachers employed by religious schools to teach "secular"
subjects comported with the Establishment Clause:67 "First, the stat-
ute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principle or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entangle-
ment with religion."' 68
The Court found that the statutes had a secular legislative pur-
pose, i.e., "to enhance the quality of the secular education in all
schools."69 However, the Court also "recognize[d] that a dedicated
religious person, teaching in a school affiliated with his or her faith
and operated to inculcate its tenets, will inevitably experience great
difficulty in remaining religiously neutral."7 Observing that "[t]he
64. Id. at 254.
65. Id. at 265 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
66. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
67. Lemon involved Pennsylvania's Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education
Act, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 24, §§ 5601-5609 (West Supp. 1971) (repealed 1977), which author-
ized the reimbursement of nonpublic schools for their expenditures for teachers' salaries,
textbooks, and instructional materials, and the Rhode Island Salary Supplement Act, R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 16-51-1 to -9 (Supp. 1970) (repealed 1980), which authorized the State to
supplement the salaries of certain parochial school teachers by 15% of their current an-
nual salary. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607-11.
68. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). In Allen, the Court observed that the line between permissible and
impermissible state aid "is not easy to locate." Allen, 392 U.S. at 242. In Lemon, the Court
asserted that "[i]n the absence of precisely stated constitutional prohibitions," these lines
must be drawn "with reference to the three main evils against which the Establishment
Clause was intended to afford protection: 'sponsorship, financial support, and active in-
volvement of the sovereign in religious activity.'" Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (quoting Wal, 397
U.S. at 668).
69. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
70. Id. at 618. The Court noted that most of the lay teachers in the Rhode Island
Roman Catholic elementary schools were members of the Catholic faith, that parochial
1999]
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State must be certain, given the Religion Clauses, that subsidized teach-
ers do not inculcate religion,"7' the Court held that the "comprehen-
sive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance . . . inevitably
. . . required to ensure that . . . the First Amendment . . . [is]
respected" violated the Establishment Clause because it created exces-
sive entanglement between the state and the religious schools.72 The
Court in Lemon distinguished the supervision required from that in
Allen, in which it upheld state loans of secular textbooks to parochial
school students, by noting that "a textbook's content is ascertainable,
but a teacher's handling of a subject is not. . . . Unlike a book, a
teacher cannot be inspected once so as to determine the extent and
intent of his or her personal beliefs and subjective acceptance of the
limitations imposed by the First Amendment."7"
The Court also noted that these programs had the potential for
dividing communities along religious lines." Although debate is nor-
mally healthy, the Court observed that "political division along reli-
schools "involve substantial religious activity and purpose," and that they are used to indoc-
trinate students into the religion. See id. at 616, 618. Furthermore, the Court stated that
parochial school teachers will "inevitably experience great difficulty in remaining religiously
neutral," in part because some of a teacher's responsibilities "[ilnevitably... hover on the
border between secular and religious orientation." Id. at 618 (emphases added). The
Court also asserted that impermissible state "surveillance" of the parochial school teachers
would "inevitably be required to ensure that... the First Amendment [is] respected." Id. at
619 (emphasis added).
The Court offered other reasons why it is "inevitable" that the parochial school teach-
ers would find it difficult to remain religiously neutral: "The teacher is employed by a
religious organization, subject to the direction and discipline of religious authorities, and
works in a system dedicated to rearing children in a particular faith." Id. at 618.
Another explanation for the Court's reliance on these "inevitable" consequences to
invalidate the programs, however, may be its "unwillingness to accept the District Court's
express findings that on the evidence before it none of the teachers ...involved mixed
religious and secular instruction." Id. at 665-66 (White, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (emphasis added).
71. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619 (emphasis added). The Court's view that the United States
Constitution required the State to be certain that its aid does not advance religion marked a
change in its approach to Establishment Clause cases. Only two years earlier, the Allen
Court rejected the argument that a book loan program might violate the Establishment
Clause because there was no evidence in the record that the program actually advanced
religion. See Allen, 392 U.S. at 245. The Allen Court said it was willing to assume in the
absence of contrary evidence that the books loaned to the students were not unsuitable for
use because of religious content. Id.
72. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
73. Id. at 617, 619.
74. Id. at 622-23. The majority's observation that state aid to religious schools could
divide the community along religious lines echoes the concern raised by the four dissent-
ingJustices in Everson that state aid to religious schools would result in "the struggle of sect
against sect for the larger share." Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 53 (1947) (Rut-
ledge, J., dissenting).
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gious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First
Amendment was intended to protect"75 and characterized this divi-
siveness as another form of entanglement.76
In his dissenting opinion, Justice White asserted that a "critical
factor" in the Court's decision to invalidate one of the statutes was its
"unwillingness to accept the District Court's express findings that on
the evidence before it none of the teachers . . .involved mixed reli-
gious and secular instruction.
77
Four years later in Meek v. Pittenger,78 the Court considered a chal-
lenge to a Pennsylvania statute that authorized the use of public em-
ployees to provide teaching and guidance counseling for exceptional,
remedial, and educationally disadvantaged students on the premises
of nonpublic schools. 79 Following Lemon, the Court held that the pro-
gram would necessitate excessive entanglement between church and
state; therefore, it violated the Establishment Clause.8 ° The majority
noted that the teachers in Meek were less likely than the parochial
school employees in Lemon to impermissibly foster religion because
they were state employees not subject to the control and discipline of
a religious institution." Nevertheless, the Court determined that the
teachers could potentially be influenced by the religious atmosphere
that pervaded the schools 2 and held that the district court erred in
relying on the good faith and professionalism of the publicly em-
ployed teachers to ensure that the program did not advance reli-
75. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622 (citing Paul A. Freund, Comment, Public Aid to Parochial
Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1692 (1969)).
76. Id. The Court did not appear to rely on this form of entanglement between gov-
ernment and religion in holding that the programs were unconstitutional. See id. at 621-
23. However, some Justices have asserted it as a basis for holding that a challenged law
violates the Establishment Clause. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 417 (1985) (Powell,
J., concurring) ("[Tihe potential for [political] divisiveness is a strong additional reason
for holding that the .. .program[ ] [is] invalid on entanglement grounds."); Wolman v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 256 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that the potential for political divisiveness, without more, required the conclusion
that the statute at issue offended the First Amendment's prohibition against laws respect-
ing an establishment of religion); id. at 258-59 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (arguing that funding for textbooks "should not be provided because of the
dangers of political 'divisiveness on religious lines'"); see also Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349, 374 (1975) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (characterizing
political divisiveness as a fourth factor of the Lemon test).
77. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 666 (White, J., dissenting).
78. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
79. Id. at 352-53.
80. Id. at 370.
81. Id. at 371.
82. Id. at 371-72.
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gion.8 ' Although the Court cited no instances of indoctrination by
public employees and admitted that "[t]he likelihood of inadvertent
fostering of religion may be less in a remedial arithmetic class than in
a medieval history seminar," it determined that "a diminished
probability of impermissible conduct is not sufficient. '' 4 The Court,
citing Lemon, again asserted that the Constitution required the state to
be certain that its teachers remained religiously neutral, and con-
cluded that the only way to be certain was to engage in some form of
continuing surveillance that would itself violate the Establishment
Clause."5
In a separate opinion, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice White,
criticized the majority's "significant sub silentio extension" of Lemon to
cases involving publicly employed teachers in private schools.8 6 He
argued that the Court's holding in Lemon flowed from the "susceptibil-
ity of parochial school teachers to 'religious control and discipline,"'
and asserted the "exorcisation of that constitutional 'evil' [in Meek
should have led] to a different constitutional result."8
There was also criticism of the Meek majority's "unsubstantiated
factual proposition '8 8 that the risk with regard to public employees
was significant enough to require the level of surveillance that gives
rise to excessive entanglement.8 9 Justice Rehnquist argued that the
Court's "ex cathedra pronouncement" that guidance counselors were as
likely as teachers to inculcate religion relieved the plaintiff of the bur-
den of proof and was "deficient as a matter of process and insupporta-
ble as a matter of law." 90
83. Id. at 369.
84. Id. at 370-71.
85. Id. at 369-72.
86. Id. at 392 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
87. Id. at 394.
88. Id. The district court in Meek had found "[t] he notion that by setting foot inside a
sectarian school a professional therapist or counselor will succumb to sectarianization of
his or her professional work is not supported by any evidence." Meek v. Pittenger, 374 F.
Supp. 639, 657 (E.D. Pa. 1974), affd in part, rev'd in part, 421 U.S. at 373.
89. Meek, 421 U.S. at 385-86 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Chief Justice Burger argued:
[T) here is no basis in 'experience and history' to conclude that a State's attempt
to provide-through the services of its own state-selected professionals-the re-
medial assistance necessary for all its children poses the same potential for unnec-
essary administrative entanglement or divisive political confrontation which
concerned the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman.
Id.
90. Id. at 391-92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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In 1985, the Court again discussed the constitutionality of pub-
licly employed teachers in religious schools in School District v. Ball1
and Aguilar v. Felton. 2 Relying on the assumptions erected in Meek
and Lemon,"3 the Aguilar Court held that the continuing supervision
required by New York's Title I program to ensure that publicly em-
ployed Title I teachers were not inculcating religion inevitably gave
rise to unconstitutional entanglement between government and the
religious schools.9 4 The Court also observed that excessive entangle-
ment would result both from the administrative cooperation required
between the schools and the state to maintain the Title I program and
from the dangers of political divisiveness along religious lines. 5 The
Shared Time program at issue in Ball, 6 which did not have a system
for monitoring teachers, was invalidated on the ground that it had the
primary effect of advancing religion.97 The Ball Court identified
three ways in which the challenged program violated this second
prong of the Lemon test.98 First, the teachers, influenced by the "per-
vasively sectarian" atmosphere of the religious schools, could subtly or
overfly inculcate religion.99 Second, the presence of publicly em-
91. 473 U.S. 373 (1985), overruled by Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2017.
92. 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2017.
93. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (discussing the Lemon Court's assump-
tion that publicly subsidized religious school teachers would experience great difficulty in
remaining religiously neutral and its conclusion that the continuing surveillance needed to
be certain that the teachers would not promote religion would constitute excessive entan-
glement); supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text (discussing the Meek Court's extension
to public employees of the Lemon Court's assumption that teachers might inculcate reli-
gion and its reaffirmation of the conclusion that the Constitution required the government
to be certain that its programs did not advance religion).
94. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409, 412-13.
95. Id. at 413-14.
96. The Shared Time program was one of two state programs challenged in BalL The
program provided classes to private school students at public expense on the premises of
the private schools. Ball 473 U.S. at 375. The classes were offered during the regular
schoolday and were intended to supplement the "core curriculum" required by the state
for accreditation. Id. Classes included remedial and enrichment mathematics, reading,
art, music, and physical education, id., and occupied approximately 10% of a private
school student's week. Id. (citing Americans United for Separation of Church & State v.
School Dist., 546 F. Supp. 1071, 1079 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (mem.)). Although the program
was only offered in private schools, similar courses were offered in the public schools. Id.
at 375-76. The classes were taught by full-time public school employees. Id. at 376. This
Note confines its discussion to the Shared Time program because that program more
closely resembled the Title I program at issue in Aguilar and Agostini.
97. Id. at 397.
98. See supra text accompanying note 68 (outlining the Lemon test).
99. Ball, 473 U.S. at 397. In Ball, as in Lemon and Meek, the record contained no evi-
dence of publicly employed teachers inculcating religion. Balk 473 U.S. at 388 (citing
Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. School Dist., 718 F.2d 1389, 1404
(6th Cir. 1983); see supra notes 70, 77, 84, 88 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of
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ployed teachers inside a sectarian school would create a "symbolic
union of church and state" that conveys a message of state support of
the school's religion to the impressionable students as well as the gen-
eral public.100 Third, the program would "subsidize the religious
functions of the parochial schools by taking over a substantial portion
of their responsibility for teaching secular subjects."10 1 For these rea-
sons, the Court held the Shared Time program unconstitutional.
C. Reconsidering the Assumptions Created by the Court
The Court set the stage for its decision in Agostini in two recent
cases which upheld state aid to students at religious schools. In Witters
v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,1 °2 the Court held that
the Establishment Clause did not prevent a state from financing a
blind person's training at a Christian college. °3 The Court reasoned
that the program did not have the primary effect of advancing reli-
gion because the financial aid was made available to individuals with-
out regard for the secular or religious nature of the institution
benefited. Any aid that ultimately flowed to a religious institution did
evidence in Lemon and Meek of indoctrination by publicly employed teachers at sectarian
schools). The Court asserted that this lack of evidence was "of little significance" because
"there is no reason to believe that this kind of ideological influence would be detected or
reported by students, by their parents, or by the school system itself." Id, at 388-89.
100. Ball. 473 U.S. at 390. The Court held that government aid has a primary effect of
advancing religion when it is likely to be perceived by adherents of the aided religion as an
endorsement, and by nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices.
Id. The Court found that the symbolic union created by the presence of publicly employed
teachers and state sponsored classes in parochial schools was especially likely to send this
message to young and impressionable students. Id.
101. Id at 397. The Court has noted that "incidental" or "indirect" benefits to religious
institutions do not necessarily render a law unconstitutional. Id. at 393 (citing Committee
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973); Roemer v. Board of
Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976) (plurality opinion); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734,
742-43 (1973)). The second prong of the Lemon test is violated only when the effect of
advancing religion is "direct and substantial." Id. at 394 (quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 783-
85 n.39). The school district argued that the program only supplemented the courses in
the current curricula and did not supplant them, and therefore did not relieve a substan-
tial portion of the school's responsibility for teaching secular subjects. Id. at 396. The
majority rejected this argument on the grounds that (1) it is impossible to know whether a
parochial school would have offered a course if the State did not offer it first, (2) the state-
sponsored courses were on topics such as math and reading that were already a part of the
parochial schools' curricula, and (3) the parochial schools could shift responsibility for
teaching certain courses to the State simply by ceasing to offer them and waiting for them
to be replaced by a state-sponsored course with the same content. Id. at 396-97.
102. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
103. Id. at 489.
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so "only as a result of the genuinely independent and private choices
of aid recipients. "104
In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,"°5 the Court consid-
ered whether the Establishment Clause barred a publicly employed
sign-language interpreter from accompanying a deaf student to his pa-
rochial high school.'" 6 The district court had held that the Establish-
ment Clause prohibited the school district from providing an
interpreter, reasoning that "'[t]he interpreter would act as a conduit
for the religious inculcation of [the student]-thereby, promoting
[the student's] religious development at government expense.
' 107
The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that the Court has "consistently
held that government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a
broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion are not
readily subject to an Establishment Clause challenge just because sec-
tarian institutions may also receive an attenuated financial benefit."10 8
The Court distinguished Meek and Ball on the grounds that (1) the
programs at issue in those cases "relieved sectarian schools of costs
they otherwise would have borne in educating their students,"10 9
whereas the school in Zobrest would not have paid for an interpreter;
and (2) the role of a sign-language interpreter is different from that of
a teacher or counselor, and there was no evidence in the record to
suggest that the interpreter would do more than accurately interpret
the material presented in class.110
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Agostini v. Felton, the Supreme Court held that recent changes
in Establishment Clause law justified relief from the injunction en-
tered after the Court's decision in Aguilar, which prohibited the use of
Title I funds for instruction by public school employees on the prem-
ises of parochial schools."' Writing for the majority, Justice
O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Ken-
104. Id at 486-87.
105. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
106. Id. at 3.
107. Id. at 5 (first alteration in original) (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at
A-35, Zobrest (No. 92-94)).
108. Id. at 8 (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Witters, 474 U.S. 481).
109. Id. at 12 (citing Witters, 474 U.S. at 487 (quoting School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373,
394 (1985), overruled by Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2017)).
110. Id. at 13. The Court noted that ethical guidelines require interpreters to "'transmit
everything that is said in exactly the same way it was intended.'" Id, (quotingJoint Appen-
dix to Brief for Petitioners at 73, Zobrest (No. 92-94)).
111. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2016.
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nedy, and Thomas, first observed that relief from an injunction under
Rule 60(b) (5) is appropriate when the movant can show "'a signifi-
cant change either in factual conditions or in law."" 2 The Court re-
jected the petitioners' argument that "the exorbitant costs of
complying with the District Court's injunction [in Aguilar] consti-
tute [d] a significant factual development warranting modification of
the injunction. '  The argument that the views expressed by five Jus-
tices in Board of Education v. Grumet'1 4 that Aguilar should be reconsid-
ered or overruled "effected a change in Establishment Clause law" was
also rejected.' 1 5
The Court then turned to the petitioners' argument that Aguilar
had been so undermined by the Court's subsequent Establishment
Clause decisions that it was no longer good law. 1 6 In examining this
question, the Court first found that Aguilar and Ball rested on four
assumptions: (1) any public employee who works in a sectarian school
is presumed to inculcate religion; (2) the presence of public employ-
ees in sectarian schools creates a "symbolic union" between church
and state; (3) public programs that directly aid the educational func-
tion of sectarian schools impermissibly finance religious indoctrina-
tion, even if the aid only reaches such schools as a result of private
decisionmaking; and (4) public employees on parochial school cam-
puses must be closely monitored in order to be certain that they do
not inculcate religion.1 1 7
The Court then sought to determine whether the Title I program
satisfied the three primary criteria that it currently uses to evaluate
whether government aid has the impermissible effect of advancing
religion-whether the aid results in governmental indoctrination, de-
fines its recipients by reference to religion, or creates an excessive en-
tanglement between church and state. 1 However, as the majority
applied this familiar three-part analysis, it reconsidered the assump-
tions that had guided the Court's application of these criteria in re-
112. Id. at 2006 (quoting Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384
(1992)).
113. Id. at 2006-07 (noting that the petitioners and the Court were aware of the costs of
complying with Aguilarat the time it was decided (citing Brief for Petitioner Agostini at 38-
40)).
114. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
115. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2007. "[T]he question of Aguilai's propriety" was not before
the Court in Grumet. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2010.
118. Id. at 2016.
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cent decades. The Court ultimately found that its recent cases had
undermined each of these assumptions.119
The Court first considered whether the Tide I program resulted
in government indoctrination of religious beliefs. The majority rea-
soned that Zobrest explicitly repudiated the assumption that a public
employee on sectarian school property will inculcate religion, 120 and
implicitly rejected the assumption that the presence of a public em-
ployee in a sectarian school creates an impermissible "symbolic link"
between church and state.
12 1
The Court also stated that Zobrest and Witters departed from the
rule relied on in Ball that any government aid that directly aids the
educational function of religious schools impermissibly finances reli-
gious indoctrination. 122 The Court observed that New York's Tide I
program was indistinguishable from the aid which it upheld in Zobrest
and Witters, because Tide I services were neutrally provided to eligible
students at whatever school they chose to attend, and by law could not
supplant the regular curricula.1 23 These services, therefore, did not
"'reliev[e] sectarian schools of costs they otherwise would have borne
in educating their students."1 24 For these reasons, the Court stated
that Zobrest and Witters "make clear that, under current law ... New
York City's Tide I program in Aguilar will not, as a matter of law, be
deemed to have the effect of advancing religion through
indoctrination."
125
The Court next considered whether the program defined its ben-
eficiaries by reference to religion, thereby subsidizing religion or cre-
ating a financial incentive for students to choose a religious school.
1 26
119. I at 2010 ("Our more recent cases have undermined the assumptions upon which
Ball and Aguilar relied.").
120. Id. at 2011 (asserting that "[i]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, we as-
sumed [in Zobrest] that the interpreter would dutifully discharge her responsibilities" and
not inculcate religious messages).
121. See id. The Court stated:
We do not see any perceptible (let alone dispositive) difference in the degree of
symbolic union between a student receiving remedial instruction in a classroom
on his sectarian school's campus and one receiving instruction in a van parked
just at the school's curbside. To draw this line based solely on the location of the
public employee is neither "sensible" nor "sound," and the Court in Zobrest re-
jected it.
Id. at 2012 (citation omitted).
122. Id. at 2012.
123. Id. at 2013 (citing 34 C.F.R § 200.12(a) (1996)).
124. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S.
1, 12 (1993)).
125. Id. at 2012.
126. Id. at 2014.
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It observed that aid allocated based on neutral, secular criteria in a
way that does not discriminate between religious and secular benefi-
ciaries "is less likely to have the effect of advancing religion."' 27 The
majority noted that although the Court had sustained programs that
provided aid to all children regardless of where they went to school,12 8
it gave this consideration no weight in Aguilar and Ball 12 9 The Court
concluded that Title I services were allocated based on criteria that
neither favored nor disfavored religion, and therefore provided no
incentive for prospective aid recipients to modify their religious be-
liefs or practices in order to receive the service.' 30 The Title I pro-
gram, therefore, did not define its recipients by reference to religion.
Finally, the Court considered whether the Title I program re-
sulted in an excessive entanglement of church and state. The majority
observed that the Court's finding of excessive entanglement in Aguilar
rested on three grounds: "(i) the program would require 'pervasive
monitoring by public authorities' to ensure that Title I employees did
not inculcate religion; (ii) the program required 'administrative coop-
eration' between the Board and parochial schools; and (iii) the pro-
gram might increase the dangers of 'political divisiveness.' 13' The
majority stated that the need for "administrative cooperation" or the
threat of "political divisiveness" are "insufficient by themselves to cre-
ate an 'excessive' entanglement" because they are present regardless
of where Title I services are offered, and no court has held that Title I
services offered to students off the sectarian school premises are un-
constitutional.3 2 The Court then held that because the assumption
underlying the supposed need for "pervasive monitoring"-that pub-
lic employees in a sectarian school would inculcate religion-was
abandoned in Zobrest, the assumption that pervasive monitoring of Ti-
tle I teachers is required must also be disregarded.' 3 For these rea-
sons, the Court held that the administration of New York's Title I
127. Id. (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981)).
128. Id. (citing Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1947); Board of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1968); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 398-99 (1983); Witters v.




131. Id. at 2015 (citing Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 413-14 (1985), overruled by Agos-
tini, 117 S. Ct. at 2017).
132. Id. (citing Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 413-14; Walker v. Board of Educ., 46 F.3d 1449 (9th
Cir. 1995); Pulido v. Cavazos, 934 F.2d 912, 919-20 (8th Cir. 1991); Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Secretary, United States Dep't of Educ., 942 F. Supp. 842
(E.D.N.Y. 1996)).
133. Id. at 2015-16.
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program does not create an excessive entanglement between govern-
ment and religion.
The Court concluded that New York City's Title I program did
not "run afoul" of any of the criteria used to evaluate "whether govern-
ment aid has the effect of advancing religion" and held:
[T]hat a federally funded program providing supplemental,
remedial instruction to disadvantaged children on a neutral
basis is not invalid under the Establishment Clause when
such instruction is given on the premises of sectarian schools
by government employees pursuant to a program containing
safeguards such as those present here. The same considera-
tions that justify this holding require us to conclude that this
carefully constrained program also cannot reasonably be
viewed as an endorsement of religion. Accordingly, we must
acknowledge that Aguilar, as well as the portion of Ball ad-
dressing Grand Rapids' Shared Time program, are no longer
good law.13 1
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens
and Ginsburg, defended "the very reasonable line drawn in Aguilar
and Bal' which permitted public employees to teach sectarian school
students only at off-campus locations.'3 5 The dissenters asserted that
the Court was able to justify relief under Rule 60(b) only by reading
Aguilar and Ball for exaggerated propositions and then interpreting
Witters and Zobrest as utterly abandoning those propositions.1
3 6
In another dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Jus-
tices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, argued that the issue whether Agui-
lar was still good law was not properly before the Court.' Appellate
courts review denials of Rule 60(b) motions for an "abuse of discre-
tion."' Lower courts must "'follow the [Supreme Court] case which
directly controls, leaving to [that] Court the prerogative of overruling
its own decisions. ' ' 1 9 Justice Ginsburg argued that because Aguilar
134. Id. at 2016 (citations omitted).
135. Id. at 2019, 2022 (Souter, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 2023-25.
137. Id. at 2026-28 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 2027 (citing Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7
(1978); System Fed'n No. 91, Ry. Employees' Dep't v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 648-50 (1961)).
139. ML (first alteration in original) (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Ex-
press, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)); see also Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2017 ("We reaffirm that
'if a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons
rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which
directly controls, leaving [the] Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.'"
(quoting Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484)).
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had not been overruled prior to Agostini,14 ° the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the motion. 141 Consequently, the
Court should have reconsidered Aguilar at a later time. 14 2
IV. ANALYsIs
Agostini improves the Supreme Court's approach to Establish-
ment Clause challenges by taking the district court's factual findings
into account and purging the decisional law that created the "un-
tested assumptions"' 4' relied on by the Court to invalidate programs
involving public employees in religious schools. These changes shift
the evidentiary burden from the government entity implementing the
program back to the party challenging the program to show that it has
the impermissible effect of advancing religion. Ultimately, the
Court's decision in Agostini is a return to, and refinement of, its early
approach to Establishment Clause challenges.' 44
In the early case of Board of Education v. Allen,145 the Court stated
that, absent evidence, it would not assume that school authorities re-
sponsible for selecting non-sectarian textbooks for public schools
would be unable or unwilling to do the same when the books were
requested by religious schools pursuant to a book loan. 146 However,
after Allen, the Court began to invalidate programs by assuming that
publicly funded teachers and counselors would be unable or unwilling
to avoid fostering religion, despite a lack of evidentiary support for
this assumption. 147 Moreover, the Court repeatedly asserted that the
140. Id. at 2027 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2028; but see Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2017-18 (rejecting this argument on the
ground that "the [trial court's] exercise of discretion cannot be permitted to stand if we
find it rests upon a legal principle that can no longer be sustained" (citing Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990))).
143. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 666 (1971) (White, J., dissenting) (character-
izing the Court's assertion that state-funded teachers in parochial schools would impermis-
sibly foster religion as an "untested assumption" that was not supported by the record).
144. See supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's analysis in Ever-
son and Allen). In the early cases of Everson and Allen, the Court attributed importance to
the actual effects of the challenged programs, rather than the possible, but unrealized,
consequences that guided the Court in later cases. In Everson, the Court analyzed the
challenged statute as it was actually applied. See text accompanying supra note 53. In Allen,
the Court refused to hold the challenged statute unconstitutional when the record con-
tained no evidence that the books provided by the States were used to teach religion. See
text accompanying supra notes 60-61.
145. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
146. Id. at 245; see also supra notes 56-62 (discussing the Court's holding and reasoning
in Allen).
147. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 388-89, 397 (1985) (noting the absence
of proof of specific incidents of religious indoctrination in the record but holding that this
[VOL. 58:300
A GOSTINI V FEL TON
government could not assume that the publicly funded teachers and
counselors would not inculcate religion because the Establishment
Clause required it to be certain that they did not. 4 The Court effec-
tively created an irrebuttable presumption that these programs were
unconstitutional by placing the burden on the government to prove
that public employees in sectarian schools did not inculcate religion
and consistently disregarding district court findings that supported
the government's position. 49 Furthermore, when the government in-
stituted safeguards to detect and prevent the inculcation of religion,
the Court held that these safeguards violated the Establishment
Clause because they gave rise to excessive entanglement, 150 thus creat-
ing a "'Catch-22' paradox"' 51 that virtually guaranteed no program
would pass constitutional muster.
Agostini extricates the government from this conundrum by aban-
doning the assumptions on which the Court has relied to invalidate
programs and considering the district court's factual findings in its
determination of whether the program is constitutional. Agostini re-
jected the assumption that the risk that publicly funded teachers or
counselors on parochial school campuses would inculcate religion is
so great as to violate the Establishment Clause.15 2 The Court noted
that in Zobrest it had instead assumed, in the absence of contrary evi-
dence, "that the interpreter would dutifully discharge her responsibili-
ties as a full-time public employee and comply with the ethical
guidelines of her profession.' 153 The Agostini Court's application of
this new assumption to publicly funded teachers signals that the Court
will require plaintiffs in future Establishment Clause challenges to
was of little significance and invalidating a program that placed publicly employed teachers
in parochial schools on the grounds that the teachers may "indoctrinate the students in
particular religious tenets"), overruled by Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2017.
148. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 369 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Reli-
gious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 778-79 (1973); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
149. See Meek, 421 U.S. at 391-92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (criticizing this approach as "deficient as a matter of process and insupportable as a
matter of law").
150. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409 (1985) (concluding that the supervisory
system maintained by New York City results in the excessive entanglement of church and
state), overruled by Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2017; Meek, 421 U.S. at 370 (explaining that "[t]he
prophylactic contacts required to ensure" that publicly employed teachers play a wholly
secular role creates "a constitutionally intolerable degree of entanglement between church
and state" (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619)).
151. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 420 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 109-10 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 668 (White, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the Court for creating this "insoluble paradox" for the government
and religious schools).
152. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2012.
153. Id. at 2011 (citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 12 (1993)).
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produce some evidence that the teachers actually inculcated
religion. 1
54
In her opinion for the Court in Agostini, Justice O'Connor argued
that Zobrest implicitly rejected Ball's and Aguilar's assumption that the
mere presence of public employees on private school property creates
a "symbolic union" between government and religion, but did not ex-
plain why. 5 5 However, her dissent in Aguilar suggests a basis for re-
jecting the "symbolic union" assumption. She reasoned that given the
lack of even a single incident of indoctrination in nineteen years, an
objective observer of the Title I program would more likely view it as
helping impoverished children get a decent education than as endors-
ing the tenets of the religious schools. 1 6
The Agostini majority also found that subsequent cases had re-jected Ball's assumption that "any and all public aid that directly aids
the educational function of religious schools impermissibly finances
religious indoctrination, even if the aid reaches such schools as a con-
sequence of private decisionmaking." 157 The Court specifically noted
that its cases had recognized that aid made available to individuals
based on neutral criteria unrelated to religion that reached religious
institutions only as a result of private decisionmaking, and that did not
relieve a religious school of costs it otherwise would have borne in
educating its students, did not have the effect of advancing religion. 151
The Court's conclusion that New York's Title I services reach schools
as a result of "private decisionmaking" essentially means that whether
the government provides the aid directly to the student or the reli-
gious school is irrelevant so long as its provision depends on the pri-
vate decisions of the individual students (or their parents) to attend
the religious school.
154. See id. at 2012 (noting that there was no evidence that instructors ever attempted to
inculcate religion and that, therefore, "both our precedent and our experience require us to
reject" this assumption (emphasis added)).
155. The Agostini dissenters argued that Aguilars implicit conclusion that the Title I
program created a symbolic link rested on the fusing of public and private faculties, not
the "mere presence" of public employees on religious school property. Id. at 2023 (Souter,J., dissenting). The majority responded that there was no constitutionally significant differ-
ence in the symbolic link created by publicly funded teachers in religious schools and the
symbolic link that is created when they teach religious school students at off-campus loca-
tions. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2012. This argument may have merit, but it does little to rebut
the dissenter's point that Zobrest did not reject the "symbolic link" assumption with regard
to teachers.
156. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 425 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
157. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2010, 2012.
158. See id. at 2011-13 (citing Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10, 12; Witters v. Washington Dep't of
Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986)).
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Agostini also signals that, absent evidence, the Court will no
longer assume that a program designed to provide only "supplemen-
tary" services will in fact relieve the religious schools of responsibility
for providing secular education. The Agostini dissenters and the Ball
majority argued that Title I services supplant the remedial instruction
already provided in New York's religious schools because sectarian
schools reduce remedial instruction once their students begin to re-
ceive Title I instruction.1"9 Additionally, they argue that it is impossi-
ble to draw the line between supplemental and general education.16 °
The Agostini majority rejected these arguments as speculative and un-
supported by any evidence on the record.161 Again, the Agostini Court
rejected the assumption relied on in past cases that public officials
could not be trusted to operate within the legal limitations imposed
by the program, and instead placed the burden back on the plaintiffs
to produce evidence that the challenged program, as applied, does in
fact relieve the religious schools of secular educational
responsibilities.162
Agostini also limited the reach of the "entanglement" prong. Be-
cause it was assumed by the Court in Aguilar that teachers were likely
to inculcate religion, the Aguilar court found that the Title I program
would require "pervasive monitoring" to be "certain" that the Estab-
lishment Clause was not violated.16 The Court held that the pervasive
monitoring itself would "inevitably" constitute excessive entangle-
ment.164 However, in Agostini, the Court held that because it had
abandoned the assumption that teachers were likely to inculcate reli-
gion, it "must also discard the assumption that pervasive monitoring of
Title I teachers is required."
165
The Court reviewed the Title I program's system of monitoring
teachers to determine whether it was adequate to prevent or detect
159. Id. at 2021 (Souter, J., dissenting).
160. Id.; see also School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 396 (1985) (explaining that the dis-
tinction between courses that supplement and those that supplant the regular curriculum
is not clear), overruled by Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2017.
161. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2013.
162. See id. (rejecting this assumption based in part on the fact that there was no evi-
dence in the record to support it).
163. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 411-13 (1985), overruled by Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at
2017.
.164. Id. at 409.
165. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2016. The Agostini Court stated that some interaction be-
tween church and state is inevitable and tolerable. See id. at 2015 (citing Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)). Entanglement is unconstitutional only when it is
"excessive." Id. (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615-17 (1988); Roemer v. Board
of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 764-65 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
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indoctrination by public employees without giving rise to excessive en-
tanglement. The majority noted that there was "no suggestion in the
record . . . that unannounced monthly visits of public supervisors
[were] insufficient to prevent or to detect inculcation of religion by
public employees." '66 The Court's decision suggests that the Estab-
lishment Clause no longer requires the State to be "certain" that its
employees will not indoctrinate students, 67 but only that reasonable
and effective safeguards be in place. 168
The Agostini Court held that the need for administrative coopera-
tion between the school systems and the potential that the program
would cause political divisiveness along religious lines did not render
the program unconstitutional, explaining that "[u]nder our current
understanding of the Establishment Clause, [these] considerations
are insufficient by themselves to create an 'excessive' entanglement.
They are present no matter where Tide I services are offered, and no
court has held that Tide I services cannot be offered off-campus." ' 9
It is unclear whether the Court was ruling out "administrative cooper-
ation" and "political divisiveness" as sufficient bases for invalidating
public aid to parochial schools, or was only claiming that they were
not present in this case to such a degree as to cause "excessive" entan-
glement. However, the fact that the dissenters did not raise these con-
siderations as grounds for finding "excessive" entanglement could
mean that they too see them as insufficient for invalidating such
aid. 1 7 0
166. Id. at 2016. In her Aguilar dissent, Justice O'Connor criticized the suggestion that
publicly employed teachers in sectarian schools require extensive supervision "because the
State must be certain that public school teachers do not inculcate religion." Aguilar, 473
U.S. at 428-29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). "That reasoning would require us to close our
public schools, for there is always some chance that a public school teacher will bring
religion into the classroom, regardless of its location." I&. at 429 (citing Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 44-45 n.23 (1985)).
167. See supra notes 71, 84, 85 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which the
Court invalidated aid programs even though there was no evidence of advancement of
religion, because the Court had to be certain that the programs would not advance
religion).
168. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2016.
169. Id. at 2015 (citing Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 413-14; Walker v. Board of Educ., 46 F.3d
1449 (9th Cir. 1995); Pulido v. Cazazos, 934 F.2d 912, 919-20 (8th Cir. 1991); Committee
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Secretary, United States Dep't of Educ., 942 F. Supp.
842 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)).
170. See id. at 2019 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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V. CONCLUSION
The Court has sent a clear message that it will no longer rely on
"untested assumptions"17 to automatically invalidate government pro-
grams that use public employees to provide services to students on the
premises of sectarian schools absent some evidence that the program
actually advances religion or leads to "excessive" entanglement in vio-
lation of the Establishment Clause. 172 Agostini places the burden on
the plaintiff to present such evidence, and marks an end to the days
when the government was essentially confronted with an irrebuttable
presumption that such programs were unconstitutional. 173 In so do-
ing, the Court has taken a significant step towards grounding its Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence in its experience rather than
speculation. 174
BRiAN SACCENTI
171. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (referring to Justice White's dissent in
Lemon, in which he characterized the Court's assertion that there was an impermissible risk
that state-funded private school teachers would inculcate religion as an "untested assump-
tion" with no support in the record).
172. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2017-19.
173. See supra notes 149-151 (describing the irrebuttable assumptions and "Catch-22"
created by the Court's holdings in Lemon, Meek, and Aguilar).
174. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2012-13 (stating that the Court must look to factual reali-
ties to determine if there is a risk of public employees being used to inculcate religious
beliefs); supra note 89 and accompanying text (quoting ChiefJustice Burger's observation
that there was no basis in "experience and history" to support the holding of the Court in
Meek).
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